Digitally signing XML files

R

Roedy Green

I wonder if there is a standard way to digitally sign XML files.

1. where do you put the signature, the public key? Can you tack them
on the end, embed them in special tags?

2. what do you sign, the encoded bytes or the chars?

3. how do you deal with transient white space that might disappear if
someone tidied the file.

4. how do you deal with platform-specific new line chars? do you
treat them as if nl, do you transform the document first, do you
preserve them?

5. what about lead trail space on fields. It this removed first?
 
J

Jaakko Kangasharju

Roedy Green said:
I wonder if there is a standard way to digitally sign XML files.

There is, W3C has a specification for XML Signatures, see
1. where do you put the signature, the public key? Can you tack them
on the end, embed them in special tags?

You put in a new element called Signature. This contains references
to the signed parts of the document and digests for each, as well as
the computed signature value. It can also contain information on the
key used, either by including the public key or a reference to it.
2. what do you sign, the encoded bytes or the chars?

Crypto algorithms typically require their input to be bytes, so that's
what you need to produce.
3. how do you deal with transient white space that might disappear if
someone tidied the file.

4. how do you deal with platform-specific new line chars? do you
treat them as if nl, do you transform the document first, do you
preserve them?

5. what about lead trail space on fields. It this removed first?

These are easiest to answer with a single word: canonicalization.
There are a couple of W3C-specified canonicalization algorithms (see,
e.g., <http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315>). Such an
algorithm takes XML and attempts to remove any incidentals so that the
same output is produced even after some reasonable XML processing.

To go to specifics, canonicalization does not permit you to alter
whitespace content of an XML document, so your point 3 would create a
different document, I cannot find anything that says newlines are
converted to any other form, and in point 5, if by "field" you mean
element content or attribute value, all whitespace is retained.
 
R

Roedy Green

These are easiest to answer with a single word: canonicalization.
There are a couple of W3C-specified canonicalization algorithms (see,
e.g., <http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315>). Such an
algorithm takes XML and attempts to remove any incidentals so that the
same output is produced even after some reasonable XML processing.

I was trying to make sense of the standard. Perhaps you have digested
it .

1. does it require you to manually embed a private ? public? key in
the xml file or will it work with ordinary code-signing certs.

2. it is up to you to compute the digests, or is that the function of
the various algorithms you specify.

3. How do they specify algorithms in a platform independent way? Are
these java code?

I am working on an idea to improve PAD file submission. These are
descriptions of shareware. The submission sites work hard to
discourage automated submission, trying to discourage spam. My idea to
fix this revolves around programmers and distribution sites having
digital certificates and everything having globally unique ids. To do
it requires a scheme for adding digital signatures to PAD files which
are a flavour of XML.
 
J

Jaakko Kangasharju

Roedy Green said:
I was trying to make sense of the standard. Perhaps you have digested
it .

I'm certainly not an expert, but I'll try.
1. does it require you to manually embed a private ? public? key in
the xml file or will it work with ordinary code-signing certs.

Sure, you can specify the key as a cert too.
2. it is up to you to compute the digests, or is that the function of
the various algorithms you specify.

I'm not quite sure what you are asking here. It's best to let
whatever implementation of XML Signature you use to handle that.
3. How do they specify algorithms in a platform independent way? Are
these java code?

Algorithms have URIs as identifiers. The signature specification
defines URIs for a few common algorithms.
I am working on an idea to improve PAD file submission. These are
descriptions of shareware. The submission sites work hard to
discourage automated submission, trying to discourage spam. My idea to
fix this revolves around programmers and distribution sites having
digital certificates and everything having globally unique ids. To do
it requires a scheme for adding digital signatures to PAD files which
are a flavour of XML.

Are you sure you have to sign XML? XML Signature is a pretty heavy
thing to do. Could you manage by just signing the whole PAD file or
is it likely that the XML needs to be processed somehow between
signing and verifying?
 
O

Oliver Wong

Roedy Green said:
I was trying to make sense of the standard. Perhaps you have digested
it .

I don't know about this XML-Signature standard in particular (the
document is too long for me to read it in its entirety), but I can give you
general information about cryptography and signing.
1. does it require you to manually embed a private ? public? key in
the xml file or will it work with ordinary code-signing certs.

Since you're signing the XML document, you probably want to distribute
the XML document. You should never distribute your private key, so the
private key would never be embedded in the XML document. If someone wishes
to verify the signature, they need access to your public key. While you
COULD embed the public key in the XML, there's no way for the person doing
the verifying to know if the public key they've found in the XML document
really belongs to you or not. So it's more common to register your public
key with an agreed upon 3rd party certification provider.

For the purpose of these PAD files, a shareware author could create an
account with the distribution sites, and as part of the registration
process, send the sites a public key. Then, whenever the PAD is submitted,
the site could verify with their (locally stored) copy of the public key to
ensure that the XML really is from the author.
2. it is up to you to compute the digests, or is that the function of
the various algorithms you specify.

This may be implementation dependent. Elsewhere in this thread, someone
mentioned Apache had an implementation for the XML-Signature standard. You
should read the documentation (JavaDocs?) for that project to find out
exactly what is your responsibility, and what their implementation will take
care of.
3. How do they specify algorithms in a platform independent way? Are
these java code?

I've seen specification in very rigorous English prose, in pseudo code,
as a mathematical formula, as C code, and sometimes as some combination of
the above. I'm guessing this XML-Signature standard doesn't actually specify
any algorithms, but rather just says once you've got an XML document, and a
signature, how can you embed one within the other, etc.
I am working on an idea to improve PAD file submission. These are
descriptions of shareware. The submission sites work hard to
discourage automated submission, trying to discourage spam. My idea to
fix this revolves around programmers and distribution sites having
digital certificates and everything having globally unique ids. To do
it requires a scheme for adding digital signatures to PAD files which
are a flavour of XML.

The central problem is ensuring that a given person cannot claim to be
two different people (which simply isn't technologically possible right
now). Even with digital signatures, a spammer could create thousands of
public-private key pairs, and still send in junk submissions, and the sites
would still have to filter through these submissions. Given an XML document
with a signature from a public key you've never seen before, how can you
tell if this is a one-off key made by a spammer, or a newbie's first
legitimate shareware submission?

- Oliver
 
I

iksrazal

Hi Roedy, I've actually done this a lot: See below for an answer to
your questions. First though, allow me to post some code. (The
enveloped signature comments have since been fixed by the xmlsec
project).

public static boolean sign(Document doc, X509Certificate cert,
PrivateKey privateKey, boolean debug) throws WSSecurityException
{
try
{
//Add SecurityHelper.class header to the SOAP message if it does
not exist
String soap_header = "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/";
org.apache.xml.security.Init.init();

/******************* XML SIGNATURE INIT ***********************
Append the signature element to proper location before signing
***************************************************************/
// Look for the SOAP header
Element headerElement = null;
NodeList nodes = doc.getElementsByTagNameNS (soap_header,
"Header");
//No nodes are expected to be found (length of zero) - add
//header here.
if(nodes.getLength() == 0)
{
headerElement = doc.createElementNS (soap_header, "Header");
nodes = doc.getElementsByTagNameNS (soap_header, "Envelope");
if(nodes != null)
{
Element envelopeElement = (Element)nodes.item(0);
headerElement.setPrefix(envelopeElement.getPrefix());
envelopeElement.appendChild(headerElement);
}
}
else
{
//This shouldn't happen unless explicity done elsewhere
Fwlog.debug(SecurityHelper.class, Fwlog.WI, "Unexpectedly Found
" + nodes.getLength() + " SOAP Header elements... probably ok but not
tested");
headerElement = (Element)nodes.item(0);
}

// http://xml-security is the base-uri, which needs to be
//unique within document
XMLSignature sig = new XMLSignature(doc, "http://xml-security",
XMLSignature.ALGO_ID_SIGNATURE_DSA);
// Add SOAP Body to XML Signature
headerElement.appendChild(sig.getElement());
// Due to the bug in the Apache security lib, it does not allow
// us to sign whole message and make "enveloped-signature"
// transform - strictly part of the specification.
// Only sign the body - IT IS NOT CONFORMED TO THE SPEC!!!!!!
//
// Neat trick: since the XMLSignature is actually a part of the
// SOAP XML document, the SOAP body is referenced as a URI
// fragment
sig.addDocument("#Body");
/******************* END XML SIGNATURE INIT
*********************/

/****************** SIGN THE FUCKER *******************/
sig.addKeyInfo(cert);
sig.addKeyInfo(cert.getPublicKey());
// Sign the XML Signature document with our private key
sig.sign(privateKey);
/****************** FUCKER SIGNED *********************/
Fwlog.debug(SecurityHelper.class, Fwlog.WI, "SecurityHelper::sign
-- tudo bem...");
return true;
}
catch (Exception e)
{
Fwlog.error(SecurityHelper.class, Fwlog.WI, "SecurityHelper::sign
-- Exception: ");
Fwlog.error(SecurityHelper.class, Fwlog.WI, e);
throw new WSSecurityException("Could not digitally sign SOAP
message", e);
}
}

/**
Verifica a assinatura do documento XML
@param doc documento XML
@return boolean true se tem succeso, false no contrário
*/
public static boolean verify(Document doc) throws WSSecurityException
{
try
{
org.apache.xml.security.Init.init();

// must match baseURI
String baseURI = "http://xml-security";
CachedXPathAPI xpathAPI = new CachedXPathAPI();
Element nsctx = doc.createElement("nsctx");
nsctx.setAttribute("xmlns:ds", Constants.SignatureSpecNS);

Element signatureElem = (Element) xpathAPI.selectSingleNode(doc,
"//ds:Signature", nsctx);
// Check to make sure that the document claims to have been
signed
if (null == signatureElem)
{
throw new IllegalStateException ("SOAP Document not digitally
signed - missing element: //ds:Signature");
}

XMLSignature sig = new XMLSignature (signatureElem, baseURI);
boolean verify = sig.checkSignatureValue
(sig.getKeyInfo().getPublicKey());
if (true == verify)
{
Fwlog.debug(SecurityHelper.class, Fwlog.WI,
"SecurityHelper::verify -- tudo bem, returning true...");
return true;
}
}
catch (Exception e)
{
Fwlog.error(SecurityHelper.class, Fwlog.WI,
"SecurityHelper::verify -- Exception: ");
Fwlog.error(SecurityHelper.class, Fwlog.WI, e);
throw new WSSecurityException("Could not verify digitally signed
SOAP message", e);
}

// signature verification failed -
//do not forward request to SOAP Service.
return false;
}

See below:

Roedy Green escreveu:
I was trying to make sense of the standard. Perhaps you have digested
it .

1. does it require you to manually embed a private ? public? key in
the xml file or will it work with ordinary code-signing certs.

You embed the keys.
2. it is up to you to compute the digests, or is that the function of
the various algorithms you specify.

Its dependant on your arguments to 'keytool' for example, ie, how you
create your PrivateKey.
3. How do they specify algorithms in a platform independent way? Are
these java code?

You can use triple des, aes etc. There's a xmlsec dependency of 'bouncy
hunter' - you might look there for more info.
I am working on an idea to improve PAD file submission. These are
descriptions of shareware. The submission sites work hard to
discourage automated submission, trying to discourage spam. My idea to
fix this revolves around programmers and distribution sites having
digital certificates and everything having globally unique ids. To do
it requires a scheme for adding digital signatures to PAD files which
are a flavour of XML.

For globally unique ids - don't forget about java.util.UUID

Sounds kool, good luck!

HTH,
iksrazal
http://www.braziloutsource.com/
 
R

Roedy Green

Since you're signing the XML document, you probably want to distribute
the XML document. You should never distribute your private key, so the
private key would never be embedded in the XML document.

I looked as if you were supposed to do this, then presumably it would
be removed after signing.

I want to spank folks so often who write specs. They seem ever so
intent on appearing learned with no interest in explaining what is
ACTUALLY happening.
 

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