limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting language implementedinto Python itself?)

Discussion in 'Python' started by Steven Bethard, Jan 25, 2005.

  1. Fuzzyman wrote:
    > Cameron Laird wrote:
    > [snip..]
    >
    >>This is a serious issue.
    >>
    >>It's also one that brings Tcl, mentioned several
    >>times in this thread, back into focus. Tcl presents
    >>the notion of "safe interpreter", that is, a sub-
    >>ordinate virtual machine which can interpret only
    >>specific commands. It's a thrillingly powerful and
    >>correct solution to the main problem Jeff and others
    >>have described.

    >
    > A better (and of course *vastly* more powerful but unfortunately only
    > a dream ;-) is a similarly limited python virutal machine.....


    Yeah, I think there are a lot of people out there who would like
    something like this, but it's not quite clear how to go about it. If
    you search Google Groups, there are a lot of examples of how you can use
    Python's object introspection to retrieve "unsafe" functions.

    I wish there was a way to, say, exec something with no builtins and with
    import disabled, so you would have to specify all the available
    bindings, e.g.:

    exec user_code in dict(ClassA=ClassA, ClassB=ClassB)

    but I suspect that even this wouldn't really solve the problem, because
    you can do things like:

    py> class ClassA(object):
    .... pass
    ....
    py> object, = ClassA.__bases__
    py> object
    <type 'object'>
    py> int = object.__subclasses__()[2]
    py> int
    <type 'int'>

    so you can retrieve a lot of the builtins. I don't know how to retrieve
    __import__ this way, but as soon as you figure that out, you can then
    do pretty much anything you want to.

    Steve
    Steven Bethard, Jan 25, 2005
    #1
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  2. Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting languageimplemented into Python itself?)

    Steven Bethard wrote:

    >
    > I wish there was a way to, say, exec something with no builtins and
    > with import disabled, so you would have to specify all the available
    > bindings, e.g.:
    >
    > exec user_code in dict(ClassA=ClassA, ClassB=ClassB)
    >
    > but I suspect that even this wouldn't really solve the problem,
    > because you can do things like:
    >
    > py> class ClassA(object):
    > ... pass
    > ...
    > py> object, = ClassA.__bases__
    > py> object
    > <type 'object'>
    > py> int = object.__subclasses__()[2]
    > py> int
    > <type 'int'>
    >
    > so you can retrieve a lot of the builtins. I don't know how to
    > retrieve __import__ this way, but as soon as you figure that out, you
    > can then do pretty much anything you want to.
    >
    > Steve


    Steve

    Safe eval recipe posted to cookbook:
    http://aspn.activestate.com/ASPN/Cookbook/Python/Recipe/364469

    Couldn't safe exec be programmed similarly?

    'import' and 'from' are syntax, so trivially avoided

    Likewise, function calls are easily intercepted

    As you say, attribute access to core functions appears to present the challenge.
    It is easy to intercept attribute access, harder to know what's safe. If there
    were a known set of 'dangerous' objects e.g., sys, file, os etc... then these
    could be checked by identity against any attribute returned

    Of course, execution would be painfully slow, due to double - interpretation.

    Michael
    Michael Spencer, Jan 25, 2005
    #2
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  3. Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting language implemented into Python itself?)

    On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 12:22:13 -0700, Steven Bethard wrote:

    > >>This is a serious issue.
    > >>
    > >>It's also one that brings Tcl, mentioned several
    > >>times in this thread, back into focus. Tcl presents
    > >>the notion of "safe interpreter", that is, a sub-
    > >>ordinate virtual machine which can interpret only
    > >>specific commands. It's a thrillingly powerful and
    > >>correct solution to the main problem Jeff and others
    > >>have described.

    > >
    > > A better (and of course *vastly* more powerful but unfortunately only
    > > a dream ;-) is a similarly limited python virutal machine.....

    >
    > Yeah, I think there are a lot of people out there who would like
    > something like this, but it's not quite clear how to go about it. If
    > you search Google Groups, there are a lot of examples of how you can use
    > Python's object introspection to retrieve "unsafe" functions.


    IMHO a safe Python would consist of a special mode that disallows all
    systemcalls that could spy/harm data (IO etc.) and imports of
    non-whitelisted modules. Additionally, a loop counter in the interpreter
    loop would ensure that the code does not stall the process/machine.

    >>> sys.safecall(func, maxcycles=1000)

    could enter the safe mode and call the func.

    I am not sure how big the patch would be, it is mainly a C macro at the
    begginning of every relevant function that checks the current "mode" and
    raises an exception if it is not correct. The import handler would need to
    check if the module is whitelisted (based on the path etc.).

    Python is too dynamic to get this working while just using tricks that
    manipulate some builtins/globals etc.

    Kind regards,
    Alexander
    Alexander Schremmer, Jan 25, 2005
    #3
  4. Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting language implemented into Python itself?)

    On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 22:08:01 +0100, I wrote:

    >>>> sys.safecall(func, maxcycles=1000)

    > could enter the safe mode and call the func.


    This might be even enhanced like this:

    >>> import sys
    >>> sys.safecall(func, maxcycles=1000,

    allowed_domains=['file-IO', 'net-IO', 'devices', 'gui'],
    allowed_modules=['_sre'])

    Every access to objects that are not in the specified domains are
    restricted by the interpreter. Additionally, external modules (which are
    expected to be not "decorated" by those security checks) have to be in the
    modules whitelist to work flawlessy (i.e. not generate exceptions).

    Any comments about this from someone who already hacked CPython?

    Kind regards,
    Alexander
    Alexander Schremmer, Jan 26, 2005
    #4
  5. Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting languageimplemented into Python itself?)

    On Wed, Jan 26, 2005 at 05:18:59PM +0100, Alexander Schremmer wrote:
    > On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 22:08:01 +0100, I wrote:
    >
    > >>>> sys.safecall(func, maxcycles=1000)

    > > could enter the safe mode and call the func.

    >
    > This might be even enhanced like this:
    >
    > >>> import sys
    > >>> sys.safecall(func, maxcycles=1000,

    > allowed_domains=['file-IO', 'net-IO', 'devices', 'gui'],
    > allowed_modules=['_sre'])
    >
    > Any comments about this from someone who already hacked CPython?


    Yes, this comes up every couple months and there is only one answer:
    This is the job of the OS.
    Java largely succeeds at doing sandboxy things because it was written that
    way from the ground up (to behave both like a program interpreter and an OS).
    Python the language was not, and the CPython interpreter definitely was not.

    Search groups.google.com for previous discussions of this on c.l.py

    -Jack
    Jack Diederich, Jan 26, 2005
    #5
  6. Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting languageimplemented into Python itself?)

    Jack Diederich wrote:
    > Yes, this comes up every couple months and there is only one answer:
    > This is the job of the OS.
    > Java largely succeeds at doing sandboxy things because it was written that
    > way from the ground up (to behave both like a program interpreter and an OS).
    > Python the language was not, and the CPython interpreter definitely was not.
    >
    > Search groups.google.com for previous discussions of this on c.l.py


    Could you give some useful queries? Every time I do this search, I get
    a few results, but never anything that really goes into the security
    holes in any depth. (They're ususally something like -- "look, given
    object, I can get int" not "look, given object, I can get eval,
    __import__, etc.)

    Steve
    Steven Bethard, Jan 26, 2005
    #6
  7. Steven Bethard

    aurora Guest

    Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting language implemented into Python itself?)

    It is really necessary to build a VM from the ground up that includes OS
    ability? What about JavaScript?


    > On Wed, Jan 26, 2005 at 05:18:59PM +0100, Alexander Schremmer wrote:
    >> On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 22:08:01 +0100, I wrote:
    >>
    >> >>>> sys.safecall(func, maxcycles=1000)
    >> > could enter the safe mode and call the func.

    >>
    >> This might be even enhanced like this:
    >>
    >> >>> import sys
    >> >>> sys.safecall(func, maxcycles=1000,

    >> allowed_domains=['file-IO', 'net-IO', 'devices',
    >> 'gui'],
    >> allowed_modules=['_sre'])
    >>
    >> Any comments about this from someone who already hacked CPython?

    >
    > Yes, this comes up every couple months and there is only one answer:
    > This is the job of the OS.
    > Java largely succeeds at doing sandboxy things because it was written
    > that
    > way from the ground up (to behave both like a program interpreter and an
    > OS).
    > Python the language was not, and the CPython interpreter definitely was
    > not.
    >
    > Search groups.google.com for previous discussions of this on c.l.py
    >
    > -Jack
    aurora, Jan 26, 2005
    #7
  8. Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting languageimplemented into Python itself?)

    On Wed, Jan 26, 2005 at 10:23:03AM -0700, Steven Bethard wrote:
    > Jack Diederich wrote:
    > >Yes, this comes up every couple months and there is only one answer:
    > >This is the job of the OS.
    > >Java largely succeeds at doing sandboxy things because it was written that
    > >way from the ground up (to behave both like a program interpreter and an
    > >OS).
    > >Python the language was not, and the CPython interpreter definitely was
    > >not.
    > >
    > >Search groups.google.com for previous discussions of this on c.l.py

    >
    > Could you give some useful queries? Every time I do this search, I get
    > a few results, but never anything that really goes into the security
    > holes in any depth. (They're ususally something like -- "look, given
    > object, I can get int" not "look, given object, I can get eval,
    > __import__, etc.)


    A search on "rexec bastion" will give you most of the threads,
    search on "rexec bastion diederich" to see the other times I tried to
    stop the threads by reccomending reading the older ones *wink*.

    Thread subjects:
    Replacement for rexec/Bastion?
    Creating a capabilities-based restricted execution system
    Embedding Python in Python
    killing thread ?

    -Jack
    Jack Diederich, Jan 26, 2005
    #8
  9. Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting languageimplemented into Python itself?)

    On Wed, Jan 26, 2005 at 10:39:18AM -0800, aurora wrote:
    > >On Wed, Jan 26, 2005 at 05:18:59PM +0100, Alexander Schremmer wrote:
    > >>On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 22:08:01 +0100, I wrote:
    > >>
    > >>>>>> sys.safecall(func, maxcycles=1000)
    > >>> could enter the safe mode and call the func.
    > >>
    > >>This might be even enhanced like this:
    > >>
    > >>>>> import sys
    > >>>>> sys.safecall(func, maxcycles=1000,
    > >> allowed_domains=['file-IO', 'net-IO', 'devices',
    > >>'gui'],
    > >> allowed_modules=['_sre'])
    > >>
    > >>Any comments about this from someone who already hacked CPython?

    > >
    > >Yes, this comes up every couple months and there is only one answer:
    > >This is the job of the OS.
    > >Java largely succeeds at doing sandboxy things because it was written
    > >that
    > >way from the ground up (to behave both like a program interpreter and an
    > >OS).
    > >Python the language was not, and the CPython interpreter definitely was
    > >not.
    > >
    > >Search groups.google.com for previous discussions of this on c.l.py
    > >

    > It is really necessary to build a VM from the ground up that includes OS
    > ability? What about JavaScript?
    >


    See the past threads I reccomend in another just-posted reply.

    Common browser implementations of Javascript have almost no features, can't
    import C-based libraries, and can easilly enter endless loops or eat all
    available memory. You could make a fork of python that matches that feature
    set, but I don't know why you would want to.

    -Jack
    Jack Diederich, Jan 26, 2005
    #9
  10. Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting languageimplemented into Python itself?)

    Jack Diederich wrote:
    > On Wed, Jan 26, 2005 at 10:23:03AM -0700, Steven Bethard wrote:
    >
    >>Jack Diederich wrote:
    >>
    >>>Yes, this comes up every couple months and there is only one answer:
    >>>This is the job of the OS.
    >>>Java largely succeeds at doing sandboxy things because it was written that
    >>>way from the ground up (to behave both like a program interpreter and an
    >>>OS).
    >>>Python the language was not, and the CPython interpreter definitely was
    >>>not.
    >>>
    >>>Search groups.google.com for previous discussions of this on c.l.py

    >>
    >>Could you give some useful queries? Every time I do this search, I get
    >>a few results, but never anything that really goes into the security
    >>holes in any depth. (They're ususally something like -- "look, given
    >>object, I can get int" not "look, given object, I can get eval,
    >>__import__, etc.)

    >
    >
    > A search on "rexec bastion" will give you most of the threads,
    > search on "rexec bastion diederich" to see the other times I tried to
    > stop the threads by reccomending reading the older ones *wink*.
    >
    > Thread subjects:
    > Replacement for rexec/Bastion?
    > Creating a capabilities-based restricted execution system
    > Embedding Python in Python
    > killing thread ?


    Thanks for the keywords -- I hadn't tried anything like any of these.
    Unfortunately, they leave me with the same feeling as before... The
    closest example that I saw that actually showed a security hole made use
    of __builtins__. As you'll note from the beginning of this thread, I
    was considering the case where no builtins are provided and imports are
    disabled.

    I also read a number of messages that had the same problems I do -- too
    many threads just say "look at google groups", without saying what to
    search for. They also often spend most of their time talking about
    abstract problems, without showing code that illustrates how to break
    the "security". For example, I never found anything close to describing
    how to retrieve, say, 'eval' or '__import__' given only 'object'.

    What would be really nice is a wiki that had examples of how to derive
    "unsafe" functions from 'object'. I'd be glad to put one together, but
    so far, I can't find many examples... If you want to consider reading
    and writing of files as "unsafe", then I guess this might be one:
    file = object.__subclasses__()[16]
    If I could see how to go from 'object' (or 'int', 'str', 'file', etc.)
    to 'eval' or '__import__', that would help out a lot...

    Steve
    Steven Bethard, Jan 26, 2005
    #10
  11. Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting language implemented into Python itself?)

    Steven Bethard <> writes on Tue, 25 Jan 2005 12:22:13 -0700:
    > Fuzzyman wrote:
    > ...
    > > A better (and of course *vastly* more powerful but unfortunately only
    > > a dream ;-) is a similarly limited python virutal machine.....


    I already wrote about the "RestrictedPython" which is part of Zope,
    didn't I?

    Please search the archive to find a description...


    Dieter
    Dieter Maurer, Jan 27, 2005
    #11
  12. Steven Bethard

    Fuzzyman Guest

    Re: limited python virtual machine (WAS: Another scripting language implemented into Python itself?)

    Dieter Maurer wrote:
    > Steven Bethard <> writes on Tue, 25 Jan 2005

    12:22:13 -0700:
    > > Fuzzyman wrote:
    > > ...
    > > > A better (and of course *vastly* more powerful but unfortunately

    only
    > > > a dream ;-) is a similarly limited python virutal machine.....

    >
    > I already wrote about the "RestrictedPython" which is part of Zope,
    > didn't I?
    >


    Not in this thread.

    > Please search the archive to find a description...
    >


    Interesting. I'd be interested in whether it requires a full Zope
    install and how easy (or otherwise) it is to setup. I'll investigate.

    Regards,
    Fuzzyman
    http://www.voidspace.org.uk/python/index.shtml

    >
    > Dieter
    Fuzzyman, Jan 28, 2005
    #12
  13. Re: limited python virtual machine

    Steven Bethard <> wrote:
    ...
    > If I could see how to go from 'object' (or 'int', 'str', 'file', etc.)
    > to 'eval' or '__import__', that would help out a lot...


    >>> object.__subclasses__()

    [<type 'type'>, <type 'weakref'>, <type 'int'>, <type 'basestring'>,
    <type 'list'>, <type 'NoneType'>, <type 'NotImplementedType'>, <type
    'module'>, <type 'zipimport.zipimporter'>, <type 'posix.stat_result'>,
    <type 'posix.statvfs_result'>, <type 'dict'>, <type 'function'>, <class
    'site._Printer'>, <class 'site._Helper'>, <type 'set'>, <type 'file'>]

    Traipse through these, find one class that has an unbound method, get
    that unbound method's func_globals, bingo.


    Alex
    Alex Martelli, Jan 28, 2005
    #13
  14. Steven Bethard

    Nick Coghlan Guest

    Re: limited python virtual machine

    Alex Martelli wrote:
    > Steven Bethard <> wrote:
    > ...
    >
    >>If I could see how to go from 'object' (or 'int', 'str', 'file', etc.)
    >>to 'eval' or '__import__', that would help out a lot...

    >
    >
    >>>>object.__subclasses__()

    >
    > [<type 'type'>, <type 'weakref'>, <type 'int'>, <type 'basestring'>,
    > <type 'list'>, <type 'NoneType'>, <type 'NotImplementedType'>, <type
    > 'module'>, <type 'zipimport.zipimporter'>, <type 'posix.stat_result'>,
    > <type 'posix.statvfs_result'>, <type 'dict'>, <type 'function'>, <class
    > 'site._Printer'>, <class 'site._Helper'>, <type 'set'>, <type 'file'>]
    >
    > Traipse through these, find one class that has an unbound method, get
    > that unbound method's func_globals, bingo.


    So long as any Python modules are imported using the same restricted environment
    their func_globals won't contain eval() or __import__ either.

    And C methods don't have func_globals at all.

    However, we're talking about building a custom interpreter here, so there's no
    reason not to simply find the dangerous functions at the C-level and replace
    their bodies with "PyErr_SetString(PyExc_Exception, "Access to this operation
    not allowed in restricted build"); return NULL;".

    Then it doesn't matter *how* you get hold of file(), it still won't work. (I can
    hear the capabilities folks screaming already. . .)

    Combine that with a pre-populated read-only sys.modules and a restricted custom
    interpreter would be quite doable. Execute it in a separate process and things
    should be fairly solid.

    Cheers,
    Nick.

    --
    Nick Coghlan | | Brisbane, Australia
    ---------------------------------------------------------------
    http://boredomandlaziness.skystorm.net
    Nick Coghlan, Jan 29, 2005
    #14
  15. Re: limited python virtual machine

    Alex Martelli wrote:
    > Steven Bethard <> wrote:
    > ...
    >
    >>If I could see how to go from 'object' (or 'int', 'str', 'file', etc.)
    >>to 'eval' or '__import__', that would help out a lot...

    >
    >
    >>>>object.__subclasses__()

    >
    > [<type 'type'>, <type 'weakref'>, <type 'int'>, <type 'basestring'>,
    > <type 'list'>, <type 'NoneType'>, <type 'NotImplementedType'>, <type
    > 'module'>, <type 'zipimport.zipimporter'>, <type 'posix.stat_result'>,
    > <type 'posix.statvfs_result'>, <type 'dict'>, <type 'function'>, <class
    > 'site._Printer'>, <class 'site._Helper'>, <type 'set'>, <type 'file'>]
    >
    > Traipse through these, find one class that has an unbound method, get
    > that unbound method's func_globals, bingo.


    Thanks for the help! I'd played around with object.__subclasses__ for
    a while, but I hadn't realized that func_globals was what I should be
    looking for.

    Here's one route to __builtins__:

    py> string_Template = object.__subclasses__()[17]
    py> builtins = string_Template.substitute.func_globals['__builtins__']
    py> builtins['eval']
    <built-in function eval>
    py> builtins['__import__']
    <built-in function __import__>

    Steve
    Steven Bethard, Jan 29, 2005
    #15
  16. Re: limited python virtual machine

    Nick Coghlan <> wrote:

    > Alex Martelli wrote:
    > > Steven Bethard <> wrote:
    > > ...
    > >
    > >>If I could see how to go from 'object' (or 'int', 'str', 'file', etc.)
    > >>to 'eval' or '__import__', that would help out a lot...

    > >
    > >>>>object.__subclasses__()

    ...
    > > Traipse through these, find one class that has an unbound method, get
    > > that unbound method's func_globals, bingo.

    >
    > So long as any Python modules are imported using the same restricted
    > environment their func_globals won't contain eval() or __import__ either.


    Sure, as long as you don't need any standard library module using eval
    from Python (or can suitably restrict them or the eval they use), etc,
    you can patch up this specific vulnerability.

    > And C methods don't have func_globals at all.


    Right, I used "unbound method" in the specific sense of "instance of
    types.UnboundMethodType" (bound ones or any Python-coded function you
    can get your paws on work just as well).

    > However, we're talking about building a custom interpreter here, so there's no


    It didn't seem to me that Steven's question was so restricted; and since
    he thanked me for my answer (which of course is probably inapplicable to
    some custom interpreter that's not written yet) it appears to me that my
    interpretation of his question was correct, and my answer useful to him.

    > reason not to simply find the dangerous functions at the C-level and replace
    > their bodies with "PyErr_SetString(PyExc_Exception, "Access to this operation
    > not allowed in restricted build"); return NULL;".
    >
    > Then it doesn't matter *how* you get hold of file(), it still won't work.
    > (I can hear the capabilities folks screaming already. . .)


    Completely removing Python-level access to anything dangerous might be a
    safer approach than trying to patch one access route after another, yes.


    > Combine that with a pre-populated read-only sys.modules and a restricted
    > custom interpreter would be quite doable. Execute it in a separate process
    > and things should be fairly solid.


    If you _can_ execute (whatever) in a separate process, then an approach
    based on BSD's "jail" or equivalent features of other OS's may be able
    to give you all you need, without needing other restrictions to be coded
    in the interpreter (or whatever else you run in that process).


    Alex
    Alex Martelli, Jan 29, 2005
    #16
  17. Steven Bethard

    Aahz Guest

    Re: limited python virtual machine

    In article <1gr3mwj.1mhbjao122j7fxN%>,
    Alex Martelli <> wrote:
    >Steven Bethard <> wrote:
    >>
    >> If I could see how to go from 'object' (or 'int', 'str', 'file', etc.)
    >> to 'eval' or '__import__', that would help out a lot...

    >
    >>>> object.__subclasses__()

    >[<type 'type'>, <type 'weakref'>, <type 'int'>, <type 'basestring'>,
    ><type 'list'>, <type 'NoneType'>, <type 'NotImplementedType'>, <type
    >'module'>, <type 'zipimport.zipimporter'>, <type 'posix.stat_result'>,
    ><type 'posix.statvfs_result'>, <type 'dict'>, <type 'function'>, <class
    >'site._Printer'>, <class 'site._Helper'>, <type 'set'>, <type 'file'>]
    >
    >Traipse through these, find one class that has an unbound method, get
    >that unbound method's func_globals, bingo.


    One thing my company has done is written a ``safe_eval()`` that uses a
    regex to disable double-underscore access.
    --
    Aahz () <*> http://www.pythoncraft.com/

    "19. A language that doesn't affect the way you think about programming,
    is not worth knowing." --Alan Perlis
    Aahz, Jan 29, 2005
    #17
  18. Re: limited python virtual machine

    Aahz <> wrote:
    ...
    > >>>> object.__subclasses__()

    ...
    > One thing my company has done is written a ``safe_eval()`` that uses a
    > regex to disable double-underscore access.


    will the regex catch getattr(object, 'subclasses'.join(['_'*2]*2)...?-)


    Alex
    Alex Martelli, Jan 29, 2005
    #18
  19. Re: limited python virtual machine


    >> One thing my company has done is written a ``safe_eval()`` that uses
    >> a regex to disable double-underscore access.


    Alex> will the regex catch getattr(object,
    Alex> 'subclasses'.join(['_'*2]*2)...?-)

    Now he has two problems. ;-)

    Skip
    Skip Montanaro, Jan 29, 2005
    #19
  20. Re: limited python virtual machine

    On Sat, 29 Jan 2005 08:53:45 -0600, Skip Montanaro <> wrote:
    >
    > >> One thing my company has done is written a ``safe_eval()`` that uses
    > >> a regex to disable double-underscore access.

    >
    > Alex> will the regex catch getattr(object,
    > Alex> 'subclasses'.join(['_'*2]*2)...?-)
    >
    > Now he has two problems. ;-)


    I nearly asked that question, then I realised that 'getattr' is quite
    easy to remove from the global namespace for the code in question, and
    assumed that they had already thought of that.

    Stephen.
    Stephen Thorne, Jan 29, 2005
    #20
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