A
Alexander Terekhov
Pete Becker wrote:
[...]
My,
<quote>
Dowling does not contest that he caused the shipment of goods in
interstate commerce, or that the shipments had sufficient value to
meet the monetary requirement. He argues, instead, that the goods
shipped were not "stolen, converted or taken by fraud."
[...]
In contrast, the Government's theory here would make theft,
conversion, or fraud equivalent to wrongful appropriation of
statutorily protected rights in copyright. The copyright owner,
however, holds no ordinary chattel. A copyright, like other
intellectual property, comprises a series of carefully defined
and carefully delimited interests to which the law affords
correspondingly exact protections. "Section 106 of the Copyright
Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights [473 U.S. 207, 217] to
the owner of the copyright," which include the rights "to publish,
copy, and distribute the author's work." Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 -547 (1985). See 17
U.S.C. 106. However, "[t]his protection has never accorded the
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his
work." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
432 (1984); id., at 462-463 (dissenting opinion). For example,
107 of the Copyright Act "codifies the traditional privilege of
other authors to make `fair use' of an earlier writer's work."
Harper & Row, supra, at 547. Likewise, 115 grants compulsory
licenses in nondramatic musical works. Thus, the property rights
of a copyright holder have a character distinct from the
possessory interest of the owner of simple "goods, wares, [or]
merchandise," for the copyright holder's dominion is subjected to
precisely defined limits.
It follows that interference with copyright does not easily equate
with theft, conversion, or fraud. The Copyright Act even employs
a separate term of art to define one who misappropriates a
copyright: "`Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner,' that is, anyone who trespasses into his
exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted
work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, `is an
infringer of the copyright.
[...]
The infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to
the copyright holder alone. But he does not assume physical control
over the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use.
While one may colloquially link infringement with some general
notion of wrongful [473 U.S. 207, 218] appropriation, infringement
plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests than
does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud. As a result, it
fits but awkwardly with the language Congress chose - "stolen,
converted or taken by fraud"
</quote>
regards,
alexander.
[...]
My,
<quote>
Dowling does not contest that he caused the shipment of goods in
interstate commerce, or that the shipments had sufficient value to
meet the monetary requirement. He argues, instead, that the goods
shipped were not "stolen, converted or taken by fraud."
[...]
In contrast, the Government's theory here would make theft,
conversion, or fraud equivalent to wrongful appropriation of
statutorily protected rights in copyright. The copyright owner,
however, holds no ordinary chattel. A copyright, like other
intellectual property, comprises a series of carefully defined
and carefully delimited interests to which the law affords
correspondingly exact protections. "Section 106 of the Copyright
Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights [473 U.S. 207, 217] to
the owner of the copyright," which include the rights "to publish,
copy, and distribute the author's work." Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 -547 (1985). See 17
U.S.C. 106. However, "[t]his protection has never accorded the
copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his
work." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
432 (1984); id., at 462-463 (dissenting opinion). For example,
107 of the Copyright Act "codifies the traditional privilege of
other authors to make `fair use' of an earlier writer's work."
Harper & Row, supra, at 547. Likewise, 115 grants compulsory
licenses in nondramatic musical works. Thus, the property rights
of a copyright holder have a character distinct from the
possessory interest of the owner of simple "goods, wares, [or]
merchandise," for the copyright holder's dominion is subjected to
precisely defined limits.
It follows that interference with copyright does not easily equate
with theft, conversion, or fraud. The Copyright Act even employs
a separate term of art to define one who misappropriates a
copyright: "`Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner,' that is, anyone who trespasses into his
exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted
work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, `is an
infringer of the copyright.
[...]
The infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to
the copyright holder alone. But he does not assume physical control
over the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its owner of its use.
While one may colloquially link infringement with some general
notion of wrongful [473 U.S. 207, 218] appropriation, infringement
plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests than
does run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud. As a result, it
fits but awkwardly with the language Congress chose - "stolen,
converted or taken by fraud"
</quote>
regards,
alexander.
