Re: How Robots Will Steal Your Job

[dan michaels]

Except that I would add that of course the answers are no, yes, no. I
agree that consciousness and intelligence are distinct characteristics
but that language is indicative of the former but not the latter. The
general idea of language I'm referring to here is the something
predicated of something type of language and not merely vocalizing and
signalling.

Regards - Lester

Yes, and as I've mentioned 6 or 23 times now, the real problem is
definitional - which makes all of these arguments somewhat pointless.
If you define consciousness such that only humans are conscious, then
your set of conscious beings contains only humans.

 

[Lester Zick]

Yes, and as I've mentioned 6 or 23 times now, the real problem is
definitional - which makes all of these arguments somewhat pointless.
If you define consciousness such that only humans are conscious, then
your set of conscious beings contains only humans.

One of the more interesting aspects of this kind of problem is that
most seem to consider the drafting of definitions to be more or less
capricious and arbitrary such that a definition drawn one way or
another becomes a polemical tool. I don't look at it this way. What we
need to understand is what definitions are correct and why. And I'm
not inclined to draw any definition in public relating to mechanical
matters unless I can explain the justification for it in mechanical
terms.

You raise quite a legitimate concern and one that I have considered
and discussed in general terms in different newgroups. The discussion
here has been considerably more neurologically oriented than others
and this has made the topic somewhat inaccessible.

My own approach is not to presume that humans are conscious or not.
Rather it is to say that the differential mechanics underlying
cognition possesses certain mechanical properties that give rise to
various kinds of sentient behavior in categorical terms. That is there
are definite categorically distinct kinds of sentient behavior in
addition to various types or species within each category.

And at the top of the categories is one which is defined in terms of
differences between cognitive differences. Cognitive differences in
themselves define what I call animals capable of locomotion and
cognition or thought. But differences between cognitive differences
yield abstract characteristics of thought which define what I call
conscious organisms possessing voluntary processes of thought.

Now there is no way to determine absolutely which organisms are of
this last type. However the category itself is clear and exists solely
in consequence of the differential implications of cognition in
general and the mechanics associated with the taking of differences.

However in assessing the nature of the last nominally conscious
category of sentient being what we find is that organisms in it would
presumptively have the faculty of predicate language - of things
predicated in terms of one another - would be self conscious and would
presumptively (I know just how silly this sounds but please bear with
me on this one) dress themselves.

Now I certainly understand that this sounds like so much special
pleading on behalf of the human race. However it really is more on the
order of extrapolation of categorical characteristics of differential
cognition. I don't claim that humans are the only coscious beings. I
just claim the the properties of fourth order differences between
differences imply certain characteristics. And among the various kinds
of sentient beings recognizable as having such characteristics there
only seem to be homo sapiens.

One other consideration is relevant here. In an apparently remarkably
short period of time modern humans emerged to populate all reaches of
the earth. And I believe in doing so they would have eradicated any
other potentially similarly conscious organisms. (I'm thinking here of
Neandertals.) Humans certainly seem to have a penchant for killing
each other so I don't see any reason they wouldn't have exterminated
any other potentially proto conscious beings.

Regards - Lester

 

[Lester Zick]

Another way to think about it is to consider various types of degraded
humans, e.g. progressive alzheimers, als, mental retardation, cerebral
palsy. I think we tend to ascribe consciousness to humans even when
they have abilities far below animals.

I think the ascription is more categorical than functional.

This notion that only humans are conscious smacks to me of tribal
think -- our side is the good/noble/conscious/intelligent side, no
matter what the evidence to the contrary, and the other side are not
even conscious. Hitler convinced himself of these notions about Poles
and Jews. It is based on an exaggerated sense of self importance in
the cosmos.

This is certainly true and forms a very relevant concern for science.

Uniqueness is rare in nature. (The eye evolved something like 6
independent times.) We should not stretch our arguments to find more
than absolutely necessary. We should be very careful if what we
propose flatters our species ego. We know what suckers we are for
flattery, even when it is blatantly insincere.

I agree completely. My approach to the problem is categorically
mechanical in nature and is explained in more detail in my collateral
reply to Dan Michaels. I just define the properties of differences
taken in terms of differences and the compounding of this principle
and ask what characteristics sentient beings in each category would
have and then proceed to ask what kinds of sentient beings seem to fit
each category.

As for the very interesting comment on uniqueness I think it very
likely that given its propensity to kill one another, homo sapiens
would have likely exterminated any other potentially proto conscious
competitor like Neandertals. Thus uniqueness would represent an
accidental by product rather than any kind of historical anomaly.

Regards - Lester

 

[Joe \Nuke Me Xemu\ Foster]

Let us say I am reflecting on a conversation I had. Now I am not
reflecting. I am eating an apple. Am I suddenly unconscious?

That could be the case! Since when does a biological system do more
than it has to? "Just good enough" appears to be the overall theme.
(Perhaps Bill Gates is God after all!) "The capacity for REFLECTION"
may be no more than the cheapest way to implement an infinite-loop
detector in wetware, and we're "conscious" only while coasting along
on autopilot fails to produce the expected results. Any illusions to
the contrary are provided by a mechanism similar to that which papers
over our abysmal .7 second sense-organ-to-brain-to-muscles round-trip
times, and even that's only when we're actually paying attention:

URL:http://skytran.net/09Safety/03sfty.htm

 

[R. Steve Walz]

Let us say I am reflecting on a conversation I had. Now I am not
reflecting. I am eating an apple. Am I suddenly unconscious?
Canadian Mind Products, Roedy Green.

-----------------
Sure, we do that all the time, Gurdieff talked about us not really
being here when we do that, but we obtain our Value by having once
been aware, and by the potential to be so again. When that stops,
the law can turn us off, someone comatose with no chance to become
reflective again as the same person as previously, is legally dead.

Everything we do regarding this stuff proves my points, repeatedly.

We eat animals, sanction abortion, and turn off comatose persons
for this same single reason, because the Universe/World/Life ONLY
exists in the Reflective Aware experience, and nothing else exists
at all or ever existed. The Many Worlds Interpetation of QM is
mis-cast and mis-named, it is actually The Many Lives Interpretation.
The Physics of the Infinite Universes only exist to Aware Persons.
The World is merely a part of that Aware Experience of Life.
All things have their existence THROUGH US!!

-Steve

 

[Roedy Green]

I can eat an apple without paying attention, or I can savour it.
Surely I am conscious savouring it.

I would say my dog Sheldon (long deceased) enjoyed his food much more
than I did. Would that not make him conscious?

Sheldon would "worry" if someone in the house was distressed. He
would get a sort of tense look on his face. Would that not be a sort
of reflection? Mulling over what the matter might be.

 

[dan michaels]

One of the more interesting aspects of this kind of problem is that
most seem to consider the drafting of definitions to be more or less
capricious and arbitrary such that a definition drawn one way or
another becomes a polemical tool. I don't look at it this way. What we
need to understand is what definitions are correct and why. And I'm
not inclined to draw any definition in public relating to mechanical
matters unless I can explain the justification for it in mechanical
terms.

You raise quite a legitimate concern and one that I have considered
and discussed in general terms in different newgroups. The discussion
here has been considerably more neurologically oriented than others
and this has made the topic somewhat inaccessible.

My own approach is not to presume that humans are conscious or not.
Rather it is to say that the differential mechanics underlying
cognition possesses certain mechanical properties that give rise to
various kinds of sentient behavior in categorical terms. That is there
are definite categorically distinct kinds of sentient behavior in
addition to various types or species within each category.

And at the top of the categories is one which is defined in terms of
differences between cognitive differences. Cognitive differences in
themselves define what I call animals capable of locomotion and
cognition or thought. But differences between cognitive differences
yield abstract characteristics of thought which define what I call
conscious organisms possessing voluntary processes of thought.

Now there is no way to determine absolutely which organisms are of
this last type. However the category itself is clear and exists solely
in consequence of the differential implications of cognition in
general and the mechanics associated with the taking of differences.

However in assessing the nature of the last nominally conscious
category of sentient being what we find is that organisms in it would
presumptively have the faculty of predicate language - of things
predicated in terms of one another - would be self conscious and would
presumptively (I know just how silly this sounds but please bear with
me on this one) dress themselves.

Now I certainly understand that this sounds like so much special
pleading on behalf of the human race. However it really is more on the
order of extrapolation of categorical characteristics of differential
cognition. I don't claim that humans are the only coscious beings. I
just claim the the properties of fourth order differences between
differences imply certain characteristics. And among the various kinds
of sentient beings recognizable as having such characteristics there
only seem to be homo sapiens.

One other consideration is relevant here. In an apparently remarkably
short period of time modern humans emerged to populate all reaches of
the earth. And I believe in doing so they would have eradicated any
other potentially similarly conscious organisms. (I'm thinking here of
Neandertals.) Humans certainly seem to have a penchant for killing
each other so I don't see any reason they wouldn't have exterminated
any other potentially proto conscious beings.

Regards - Lester

Hi Lester, well I can agree with most of what you've said here, but
again, all it seems to me that you have done is to make your
definitions such that only humans can be included in the "club".
Basically, as I've impled above, this is really just circular
argumentation. You get what you define.

I do take issue with a couple of things you've said ...

"... What we need to understand is what definitions are correct and
why ..."
- personally, I don't think you - or anyone - can even do this regards
something like consciousness.

"... But differences between cognitive differences yield abstract
characteristics of thought which define what I call conscious
organisms possessing voluntary processes of thought ..."
- here I think you've made your definition so tight that only humans
need apply.

"... However in assessing the nature of the last nominally conscious
category of sentient being what we find is that organisms in it would
presumptively have the faculty of predicate language ..."
- and here you've iced it.

"... In an apparently remarkably short period of time modern humans
emerged to populate all reaches of the earth ..."
- is this because of consciousness, or because of intelligence and
aggression?

 

[Programmer Dude]

Let us say I am reflecting on a conversation I had. Now I am not
reflecting. I am eating an apple. Am I suddenly unconscious?

It is your *capacity* for reflection that sets you apart, not that
you reflect 24/7.

 

[Lester Zick]

[. . .]

Hi Lester, well I can agree with most of what you've said here, but
again, all it seems to me that you have done is to make your
definitions such that only humans can be included in the "club".
Basically, as I've impled above, this is really just circular
argumentation. You get what you define.

I do take issue with a couple of things you've said ...

"... What we need to understand is what definitions are correct and
why ..."
- personally, I don't think you - or anyone - can even do this regards
something like consciousness.

"... But differences between cognitive differences yield abstract
characteristics of thought which define what I call conscious
organisms possessing voluntary processes of thought ..."
- here I think you've made your definition so tight that only humans
need apply.

"... However in assessing the nature of the last nominally conscious
category of sentient being what we find is that organisms in it would
presumptively have the faculty of predicate language ..."
- and here you've iced it.

"... In an apparently remarkably short period of time modern humans
emerged to populate all reaches of the earth ..."
- is this because of consciousness, or because of intelligence and
aggression?

Hi Dan - Just in regard to this last observation - I'm just not sure.
These aspects of behavior seem innate in the wild. I suspect we're
just better at it because we're conscious. And I think that's the
reason the evolution of homo sapiens took such a fantastically
radical leap over the course of the last couple hundred millenia.

As for your other observations, I can agree with what you say. But the
real question of the definitions I use is whether they represent so
much special pleading on my part to accommodate homo sapiens as the
sole member of the conscious clique or whether those definitions are
drawn in strictly mechanical terms from the idea of differences and
differences among differences etc. I would obviously claim the latter
which would make the issue non circular and not a matter of self
justification if the mechanical framework I'm suggesting applies.

Regards - Lester

 

[Lester Zick]

[. . .]

Hi Lester, well I can agree with most of what you've said here, but
again, all it seems to me that you have done is to make your
definitions such that only humans can be included in the "club".
Basically, as I've impled above, this is really just circular
argumentation. You get what you define.

I do take issue with a couple of things you've said ...

"... What we need to understand is what definitions are correct and
why ..."
- personally, I don't think you - or anyone - can even do this regards
something like consciousness.

"... But differences between cognitive differences yield abstract
characteristics of thought which define what I call conscious
organisms possessing voluntary processes of thought ..."
- here I think you've made your definition so tight that only humans
need apply.

"... However in assessing the nature of the last nominally conscious
category of sentient being what we find is that organisms in it would
presumptively have the faculty of predicate language ..."
- and here you've iced it.

"... In an apparently remarkably short period of time modern humans
emerged to populate all reaches of the earth ..."
- is this because of consciousness, or because of intelligence and
aggression?

Hi Dan - Just in regard to this last observation - I'm just not sure.
These aspects of behavior seem innate in the wild. I suspect we're
just better at it because we're conscious. And I think that's the
reason the evolution of homo sapiens took such a fantastically
radical leap over the course of the last couple hundred millenia.

As for your other observations, I can agree with what you say. But the
real question of the definitions I use is whether they represent so
much special pleading on my part to accommodate homo sapiens as the
sole member of the conscious clique or whether those definitions are
drawn in strictly mechanical terms from the idea of differences and
differences among differences etc. I would obviously claim the latter
which would make the issue non circular and not a matter of self
justification if the mechanical framework I'm suggesting applies.

Regards - Lester

 

[Roedy Green]

It is your *capacity* for reflection that sets you apart, not that
you reflect 24/7.

That makes no sense. That is like saying the ability to pilot a plane
is what makes a great cook.

 

[Roedy Green]

I suspect we're
just better at it because we're conscious.

how does being conscious in any way help you make better decisions?

Do you ascribe decision making as well as witnessing to consciousness?

 

[Programmer Dude]

That makes no sense. That is like saying the ability to pilot a
plane is what makes a great cook.

?? THAT makes no sense, you're right about that!

Look back at what you wrote. I'm saying that your ability to pilot
a plane makes you a pilot, EVEN THOUGH you are sometimes sleeping
(and presumably NOT a pilot at that moment).

 

[R. Steve Walz]

That makes no sense. That is like saying the ability to pilot a plane
is what makes a great cook.
Canadian Mind Products, Roedy Green.

 

[dan michaels]

(e-mail address removed) (Lester Zick) wrote in message

I would obviously claim the latter

which would make the issue non circular and not a matter of self
justification if the mechanical framework I'm suggesting applies.

Regards - Lester

Actually, despite my having made a few posts to this thread, I greatly
dislike discussions of consciousness in general ... due to the [you
guessed it] general circular nature of 99% of the arguments. ;-)

At least Edelman's and Humphrey's ideas about primary and higher-order
[ala 1st + 2nd order] C include only living animals, and they also
allow higher-animals besides humans some semblance of C. No
circular-logic argumentation regarding thermostats, quantum state
changes, and computers .... plus a blind man can take some comfort in
thinking that the guide-dog leading him across the street in the
spectre of rush-hour traffic has some awareness of what it's up to.

- dan
==================

 

[Noah Roberts]

To the origional question, I have the answer.

After seing much of the discussion in this thread I have come to the
undeniable conclusion that intelligence, if there is such a thing, is
not getting in discussions about what intelligence is.

NR

 

[bob]

To the origional question, I have the answer.

After seing much of the discussion in this thread I have come to the
undeniable conclusion that intelligence, if there is such a thing, is
not getting in discussions about what intelligence is.

NR

.... and don't forget the famous line from the Virginian or some other
western novel ... and smile when you say that, pardnur.

 

[Lester Zick]

how does being conscious in any way help you make better decisions?

The direct result of the faculty of consciousness is the production of
abstract information. Abstract information is abstract in the sense
that it is abstract from a being's own being. Consequently it is
universal information in the sense of being portable and applicable to
a wide variety of circumstances other than those of the being knowing
it. Thus it acquires a value and utility far out of proportion to its
local utility to the sentient organism alone.

In other words it gains universal applicability. However what it loses
in as a result is certainty. In other words the applicability of
abstract information is problematic because conscious beings have to
figure out how it applies to a variety of circumstances other than
those in which it is produced. Non abstract information on the other
hand applies however it does to the circumstances of the sentient
being at hand because it is part of those circumstances.

This is the reason self consciousness produces doubt and self doubt:
because the conscious being cannot tell how, if, or whether the
information it knows in abstract terms applies at all. Non conscious
organisms do not face this problem because the information they
produce and have applies to its circumstances however it may apply -
whether for good or bad - because it is produced in the context of
those circumstances of its being.

Do you ascribe decision making as well as witnessing to consciousness?

No. Decision making is inherent in the mechanical results of
differences generally and all forms of sentient being make decisions
in this respect as a result of their being.

As far as witnessing consciousness, I assume by the phrase you mean
self consciousness, yes definitely that is first evidence of
consciousness. It occurs because it signifies awareness of abstract
knowledge within the sentient being. In other words a sentient being
by virtue of being conscious is aware that there is something known
that is abstract from his circumstances as a being. However the idea
of being conscious only refers to the production and occurrence of
abstract information. A sentient being is conscious because the nature
of its being produces abstract information and the conscious being is
self conscious because the information is abstract.

Regards - Lester

 

[Lester Zick]

(e-mail address removed) (Lester Zick) wrote in message

I would obviously claim the latter

which would make the issue non circular and not a matter of self
justification if the mechanical framework I'm suggesting applies.

Regards - Lester

Actually, despite my having made a few posts to this thread, I greatly
dislike discussions of consciousness in general ... due to the [you
guessed it] general circular nature of 99% of the arguments. ;-)

I understand and concur. I don't participate in those kinds of
discussions and is the reason I didn't post to this thread in the
beginning because the conversation becomes frustrating and frankly
repetitive. It's very hard to get people to see the futility of the
kinds of rationalizations they use.

At least Edelman's and Humphrey's ideas about primary and higher-order
[ala 1st + 2nd order] C include only living animals, and they also
allow higher-animals besides humans some semblance of C. No
circular-logic argumentation regarding thermostats, quantum state
changes, and computers .... plus a blind man can take some comfort in
thinking that the guide-dog leading him across the street in the
spectre of rush-hour traffic has some awareness of what it's up to.

Well of course awareness and consciousness are not the same in my
book. What I note first in the context of the faculty of consciousness
is self consciousness, a comment I make in a collateral reply to Roedy
Green on this subject.

I am also dissatisfied with the kinds of approaches to the analysis of
consciousness like those you describe above because they are
speculative in nature and offer no potential mechanical insight as to
why things are one way and not another.

This is the reason I draw a definite distinction between non conscious
animals and conscious beings like homo sapiens. a conclusion so
amusing and strange to Glen. Categories of sentient being are drawn in
terms of major differences or distinctions pertinent to beings in a
particular category. We don't refer to plants the way we do to
hydrocarbons nor to animals the way we do to plants nor should we
refer to conscious beings the way we do to animals for the same
reasons, an argument intuitively obvious to the casual observer but
apparently lost on Glen. But then many scientific arguments are lost
on Glen.

Basically I consider that the defining characteristic for animals to
be involuntary cognition and the defining characteristic for conscious
beings voluntary cogntion. Of course the issue as to whether homo
sapiens is the only member of the latter category of sentient being or
not is another matter.

Regards - Lester

 

[dan michaels]

At least Edelman's and Humphrey's ideas about primary and higher-order
[ala 1st + 2nd order] C include only living animals, and they also
allow higher-animals besides humans some semblance of C. No
circular-logic argumentation regarding thermostats, quantum state
changes, and computers .... plus a blind man can take some comfort in
thinking that the guide-dog leading him across the street in the
spectre of rush-hour traffic has some awareness of what it's up to.

Well of course awareness and consciousness are not the same in my
book. What I note first in the context of the faculty of consciousness
is self consciousness, a comment I make in a collateral reply to Roedy
Green on this subject.

I am also dissatisfied with the kinds of approaches to the analysis of
consciousness like those you describe above because they are
speculative in nature and offer no potential mechanical insight as to
why things are one way and not another.

This is the reason I draw a definite distinction between non conscious
animals and conscious beings like homo sapiens.

....................


In point of fact, Edelman has been investigating and simulating
neuronal mechanisms of perception and consciousness for many years.
His models are heavily based upon neuroanatomy and neurophysiology. He
understands how similar are the brain organizations of higher mammals,
and wishes to understand what it is that makes humans different from
the animals, in terms of the underlying neuronal mechanisms. This
approach trumps all philosophical speculations ever made since the
beginning of time, and provides a basis for making the distinction he
does between primary and higher-order C.

This approach makes great sense at this point in time, and holds great
interest to computer jockeys such as myself. We have enormous amounts
of computer power available to use in creating models and simulations.
In contrast, wet neurophysiology is still stuck in the doldrums of
single-unit recordings, etc. So, we can either wait 50 more years for
neurophysiology techniques to tell us more, or else use what we
currently know to create computer simulations that might give us
additional insight. This is what Edelman has been doing.
====================

Basically I consider that the defining characteristic for animals to
be involuntary cognition and the defining characteristic for conscious
beings voluntary cogntion.

Which probably wouldn't be too far away from Edelman bipartate
classifications of primary and higher-order consciousness.
===============


Of course the issue as to whether homo

sapiens is the only member of the latter category of sentient being or
not is another matter.

Regards - Lester

In which case, I think Edleman's classification scheme has already
trumped you.

regards - dan ;-)
=========================