Why do you ignore the very rich literature about this?
All those books are just nonsense?
I did't say that any reference material on the subject was "nonsense":
I said that it wasn't "complete".
Please, if you do not know this subject, do not send this kind
of misinformation.
"Security is a process, not a product."
(Bruce Schneier, "Secrets and Lies", preface
http://www.schneier.com/book-sandl-pref.html )
If you could create a *complete* text on security in C (especially
if OS calls are to be allowed) then you would have created a security
*product*, a finished thing that you expected would be secure against
all known and yet-to-be-discovered attacks. Security in the real world
doesn't work that way.
There can be texts describing lessons learned from the past and
giving very valuable information about how to avoid what has gone
before -- but those texts are not going to be *complete*.
Perhaps, Jacob, this is a language difference. In English, a "complete
text" would be one that contains everything there is to know about the
subject, not just everything -currently- known on an evolving topic.
For example, there could hypothetically be a "complete" book describing
every type of Wedgewood china made between 1914 and 1952, but there
cannot, for example, be a "complete" book describing all the species of
worms on earth, as there are many still unclassified and many still
being discovered.