Pete Becker wrote:
[...]
A distinction without a difference, if it exists at all.
Read the decision (and the quote). Here's another quote:
<quote source=digital-law-online.info>
Section 506 makes a number of things criminal offenses, including
fraudulent copyright notices, fraudulent removal of copyright notices,
and making false statements in a copyright registration application.
{FN85: 17 U.S.C. §506} But it primarily criminalizes copyright
infringement when it is done "willfully" and either "for purposes of
commercial advantage or private financial gain” or when the
infringement exceeds a total retail value of $1,000 within any 180-
day period. If the total retail value exceeds $2,500 and ten copies,
the crime becomes a felony with the possibility of a $250,000 fine and
five years in prison (ten years on a second offense), {FN86: 18 U.S.C.
§2319} although the sentencing guidelines require that the retail
value be substantially above $2,500 for any prison time, and in the
millions to reach the maximum penalty.
Although the copyright statutes do not contain a definition for
"willfully," the term has been given meaning in a number of past
court decisions on copyright and other law. At the passage of the
latest amendment to the criminal provision, Senator Orrin Hatch, the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, discussed the
importance of the willfulness requirement:
I place great store by the "willfulness" requirement in the bill.
Although there is on-going debate about what precisely is the
"willfulness" standard in the Copyright Act – as the House Report
records – I submit that in the LaMacchia context "willful" ought to
mean the intent to violate a known legal duty. The Supreme Court has
given the term "willful" that construction in numerous cases in the
past 25 years . . . As Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, that is
the interpretation that I give to this term. Otherwise, I would have
objected and not allowed this bill to pass by unanimous consent.
Under this standard, then, an educator who in good faith believes
that he or she is engaging in a fair use of copyrighted material
could not be prosecuted under the bill. . . .
Finally, Mr. President, I would like to point out two areas that
are susceptible to interpretation mischief.
First, the bill amends the term "financial gain" as used in the
Copyright Act to include "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of
anything of value, including receipt of other copyrighted works."
The intent of the change is to hold criminally liable those who do
not receive or expect to receive money but who receive tangible
value. It would be contrary to the intent of the provision,
according to my understanding, if "anything of value" would be so
broadly read as to include enhancement of reputation or value
remote from the criminal act, such as a job promotion. {FN87: 143
Cong. Rec. S12689-S12690}
</quote>
See the difference?
regards,
alexander.
